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ABSTRACT
Ethiopia is generally considered to have ‘a dominant party authoritarian’ system
in which the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), along
with its affiliates, enjoy electoral dominance. This contribution argues that
EPRDF’s electoral dominance in the 2015 regional elections, indeed in all the
elections held in the past two decades, is partly the result of the party’s use of
what Schedler refers to ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ including
electoral rules, government agencies, local authorities and even civil society
organizations, to maintain its dominance. The semi-consociational system that
guides the relationships of the constituent parties of EPRDF also provides the
latter an electoral edge over the opposition parties which are often
fragmented. The paper further argues that EPRDF’s vanguardist self-view,
which is an offshoot of its ‘revolutionary democracy’ ideology, underpins its
drive to be a dominant party and to use all of the institutional manipulations
under its disposal.
KEYWORDS Regional election; Ethiopia; regional states; 2015; federalism
Introduction
Ethiopia, once a unitary state, became a federation in 1995. The country began
its journey towards federalism in 1991 after the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolution-
ary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnic rebel groups, ousted the
Derg, the former military junta, after 17 years of gruesome civil war. Following
four years of interim period, the 1995 Constitution was adopted which
entrenched the federal system which is made up of a federal government,
nine regions and a federal city, Addis Ababa.1
Since 1991 five national and local and six regional elections were held in
the country. EPRDF and its affiliates were declared winners in all of the elec-
tions hitherto held. Opposition parties had certain, indeed growing, represen-
tation in Parliament and regional councils in the first three elections. Their
representation, however, dropped sharply in the 2010 election and became
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zero in the 2015 general election. The 2015 election, which is the focus of this
contribution, resulted in EPRDF’s complete dominance of all federal and
regional councils giving a rise to a de facto one-party system. This begs the
question: what explains EPRDF’s exclusive dominance of all levels of
government?
EPRDF attributes its electoral dominance to the popularity it gained owing
to its role in ousting the Derg and the economic growth and improved social
service provisions that are achieved under its leadership. This is not totally
incorrect. However, EPRDF’s popularity, on its own, does not explain the elec-
toral results of the past two decades. This contribution argues the regime in
Ethiopia is in the category of ‘electoral authoritarians’, more specifically, ‘domi-
nant party authoritarians’ in which EPRDF and its affiliates, exercise exclusive
political control in the country (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009; Arriola and Lyons,
2016). As an electoral authoritarian, EPRDF uses what Schedler (2010) calls
‘menus of institutional manipulations’ in order to maintain its dominance.
The semi-consociational system that guides the relationship of the constitu-
ent parties of EPRDF also provides the latter an electoral edge over the oppo-
sition parties which are often fragmented. The paper then takes a step back
and attempts to explain what underlies EPRDF’s electoral authoritarianism
and argues EPRDF’s vanguardist self-view, which is an offshoot of its ‘revolu-
tionary democracy’ ideology, underpins its drive to be a dominant party and
to use all of the institutional manipulations under its disposal.
The paper begins with a discussion of what electoral authoritarians are,
why they hold elections and the ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ they
employ to retain their incumbency. It then deals with the political and insti-
tutional context within which the 2015 regional election was held. It intro-
duces the political structures of the nine regions followed by a brief
discussion of the political parties and the electoral system in use in the
country. After outlining the results of the 2015 regional election, the paper
turns to EPRDF’s ‘menus of institutional manipulations’ that help it sustain
its dominance. Finally, it discusses the party’s notion of vanguardism that
drives its electoral authoritarianism.
Electoral authoritarians and their ‘menu of institutional
manipulations’
Totalitarian dictatorships – those that assume, and cling to, power without
elections – seem to be out of fashion and very small number of them are in
existence today. Most states now organize elections at national and/or subna-
tional levels. This has specially been the case since the end of the Cold War.
Yet only a handful of states, mostly western countries, are considered as gen-
uinely democratic. The rest are in the ‘foggy zone between liberal democracy
and closed authoritarianism’ which is known as ‘electoral authoritarianism’
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(Schedler, 2002a).2 Electoral authoritarians come in different shapes and forms
including hegemonic authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, and dominant
party authoritarian (Donno, 2013). Unlike totalitarian regimes, electoral
authoritarians organize, often multiparty and regular, elections. However,
they do not envision elections to be a mechanism of gaining political
powers but of legitimising their hold on power (Gandhi and Lust-Okar,
2009: 405). They also use elections as a ‘safety valve’ to allow the public let
off steam and express its displeasures and frustrations so that it does not
resort to uprisings. Moreover, they use elections to measure their level of
support so that they can co-opt or coerce groups and individuals opposing
them (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Elections also help electoral authoritarians
keep opposition parties in the political game since the latter are in general
presumed to have a chance, though slim, of gaining power through elections.
This, in turn, allows the former to maintain some level of democratic facade
which would be completely lost in the absence of the latter (Bhasin and
Gandhi, 2013: 621).
Almost all electoral authoritarian regimes thus organize elections though
without the intention to lose them. Schedler (2002a: 47) maintains ‘[w]hile
democracy is “a system in which parties lose elections”, electoral authoritarian-
ism is a system in which opposition parties lose elections’ (emphasis in the
original). Electoral authoritarians have a ‘menu of institutional manipulations’
under their disposal that help them tilt electoral odds in their favour so that
they can retain their incumbency (Schedler, 2010). In the menu are favourable
electoral laws, disempowered or reliable judiciary, organs of elections
administration, controlled media, local government, civil society organizations
(CSO), and the like (Schedler, 2010).
Having direct and indirect control over national legislative organs, author-
itarian regimes ensure that ‘the basic rules of electoral games’, including
the electoral systems, are designed in their favour. Democratic elections pre-
suppose the existence of ‘alternative sources of information’ for voters.
However authoritarian regimes retain direct and indirect control over the
media and restrict voters’ access to information about alternative policies
and parties (Schedler, 2010: 72). They even actively engage in acts of misinfor-
mation. In addition, they undermine the role of judicial organs as guardians of
democracy either by disempowering them, for instance, by denying ordinary
courts of the power to adjudicate electoral disputes, or by ensuring that judi-
cial positions are filled with ‘politically reliable’ judges (Schedler, 2010). More-
over, authoritarian regimes either restrict or co-opt civil society organizations
thereby keeping citizens from forming independent associations. They also
contrive ways of fragmenting opposition political parties (Schedler, 2002b:
107). Organs which are in charge of administering elections are expected to
have ‘administrative efficiency, political neutrality and public accountability’
(Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002: 8). However, such organs in authoritarian
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systems lack specially the last two elements. The rulers manipulate these insti-
tutions to commit ‘electoral fraud’ at the various stages of electoral adminis-
tration ranging from voters’ registration to ‘the tally of the votes’ (Schedler,
2002b: 105). Furthermore, authoritarian regimes deem critical having a
direct or indirect control over local authorities for retaining their incumbency.
They hence use various institutional mechanisms to put local authorities
under their thumbs including establishing parallel bureaucracy that competes
with local authorities, by insisting on retaining the power to appoint local
authorities or by requiring the latter to be accountable to them. In addition
to the above, authoritarian regimes use other overtly illegal measures such
as physically eliminating dissenters, violent campaign, and the like (Schedler,
2002b: 105).
It will be shown below that EPRDF uses the above and other institutional
manipulations to retain its incumbency.
The political and institutional context for the 2015 regional
elections
The political institutions of the states
Ethiopia has what is often referred to as a dual federal system in which politi-
cal, judicial and administrative powers are, in principle, neatly divided
between the federal and state governments (Assefa, 2007). The federal gov-
ernment has a bicameral legislative house, a parliamentary executive, and a
judiciary.3 Likewise, each of the nine states has a legislative council (a state
council) a parliamentary executive (state administration), and a state judiciary
(FDRE Constitution art 50(3) & (6) & 45).
Political parties
There are 63 political parties that are currently registered by National Electoral
Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) of which 23 are national political parties while the
rest are regional parties.4 The political parties existing in Ethiopia are often
classified into three categories based on their political programme and stand-
ing; EPRDF, EPRDF’s affiliate parties, and opposition parties (Wondwosen,
2009). EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic-based regional political parties;
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). Tigray People Liberation
Front (TPLF), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), and the
Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM). These regional
parties, in theory, have equal weight and are represented by an equal number
of people in EPRDF’s central and executive committees despite the difference
in the number and population size of the ethnic communities each party
claims to represent. However, many consider the TPLF as the most influential
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member of EPRDF since it played a major role in the civil war that saw the Derg
ousted. EPRDF has been the ruling party at the federal level since the transi-
tional period. ANDM, OPDO, TPLF, and the SEPDP each controls the Amhara,
Oromia, Tigray and SNNP regions, respectively, where over 70 percent of the
Ethiopian people live.
EPRDF’s affiliates are Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Somali
People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic
Party (BGPDP), Gambela people’s Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM),
and Harari National League (HNL) (Wondwosen, 2008). These are also regional
and ethnic-based parties and in charge of the Afar, Somali, Benishangul-
Gumuz, and Gambella regions, respectively. The affiliate parties are not oppo-
sition parties per se. In fact, they have identical ideological orientation and
political programmes with EPRDF’s constituent parties. It is also often
alleged that these are the creation of EPRDF itself.5
Most of the opposition parties are regional or local ethnic-based political
parties, which operate either alone or by forming a regional or national
coalition. Among the major national collations of ethnic-based parties in
the opposition camp are the Ethiopia Federal Democratic Unity Forum (in
its Amharic acronym known as Medrek) and the Ethiopian Justice and Demo-
cratic Forces Front (EJDFF).6 Not only do the ethnic opposition parties support
the ethnic federal system but also promote its implementation to the letter.7
There are also a few political parties that claim to have a supra-ethnic political
outlook and multi-ethnic memberships which seek either to scrap or reform
the ethnic federal system. The Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) and Blue
Party (BP) are among the major opposition parties in this category.
Dozens of opposition parties had emerged into the Ethiopian political
scene since the establishment of the Ethiopian federation. Most have
however disappeared having little or no impacts on the country’s politics.
The two opposition political parties, which had a noteworthy electoral
success, were the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), a coalition of
four national opposition parties, and the United Ethiopian Democratic
Forces (UEDF), a collation of several ethnic-based parties. These, between
themselves, secured over 174 parliamentary seats in the highly contested
2005 general elections. The CUD even won every seat of the Addis Ababa
City Council in the same election, even though it failed to administer the
city since its leaders were imprisoned in connection with the political
turmoil that followed the elections.
Electoral system
The federal Constitution (art 54(2)) provides that the first-pass-the-post (FPTP),
a version of the plurality electoral system, would be used in federal elections.
Under this system, members of the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR),
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the lower house of parliament, are elected form a single member constitu-
ency, by a plurality of votes cast. The Constitution does not prescribe a specific
electoral system for subnational elections and leaves that to HoPR to legisla-
tively determine. As per Article 25 of Proclamation 532(2007), which HoPR
enacted to regulate federal and subnational elections, a version of the plural-
ity system that uses multimember constituencies is employed in state and
local elections.
Elections in Ethiopia
There are two main categories of elections in Ethiopia, general and local elec-
tions. The general election includes the election to the HoPR (national elec-
tions) and state (regional) councils (regional election) (Proclamation 532
(2007), art 28). All sub-regional elections (zonal, woreda and kebele) are in
the category of local election. The election to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa
Councils are also held as a part of local elections.8 The general elections are
held on the same day, in the month of May, every five years.9 The elections
to all of the nine state councils are conducted simultaneously even though,
twice or so, the election to the Somali state council was held separately due
to the poor security situation in the region.10
The Constitution, while clearly stating HoPR would have a maximum of 550
seats, is however silent on the size of regional councils. The election proclama-
tion, on the other hand, authorizes the states to determine the size of their
councils in their state constitutions. As Table 1 shows, there are a total of
1989 electoral positions at the state level. The sizes of state councils differ
from one region to the other depending on the territorial and population
size and the ethnic diversity of the people in each region.
Oromia, which is, both territorially and in terms of population size, the
largest region in the country, has the biggest state council which is nearly
equal to the HoPR. The SNNP, third in terms population size, has the
second largest states council. This is perhaps because the region, with over
56 ethnic communities in it, is the most ethnically diverse state. Many of
Table 1. The number of seats in state councils.
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the ethnic communities in this region have a few thousand population. They
could thus be represented only in the special scheme that the Constitution
envisages, not in the regular electoral process.
This seems to have required the state council to have a relatively large size.
For the purpose of general elections (national and state elections) the NEBE
has created constituencies by taking as the basis aworeda (district), which pre-
sumably has approximately 100,000 population (Proclamation 532(2007), art
20(1)). Every elector in each constituency casts his/her vote for a party or an
independent candidate (IC), if any, to the HoPR and another (single) vote
for a party to a regional council. The Constitution (art 54(3)) provides that min-
ority ethnic communities, which cannot be represented in the HoPR and state
councils through the normal electoral process, would be represented through
a special procedure, without, however, defining the procedure.
The May 2015 regional elections
Candidates and voters
The NEBE official report shows 36,851,461 voters registered for the 2015
general elections. And on the day of election, 34,332,298 people came out
to cast their votes which puts the voter turnout at approximately 93
percent; an exceedingly high voter turnout. Of the total votes cast,
33,201,969 (96.7%) were counted to be valid.11
Some 3991 candidates (3022 men and 969 women) contested in the
regional elections; an average of two candidates to every seat in every
regional council. These candidates contested in the regional elections repre-
senting 47 political parties (coalitions, fronts, and single parties). Three ICs also
took part in the elections. Indeed, not every political party, not even EPRDF,
had candidates in every region or constituency for the election. Yet in eight
of the nine regions a minimum of five political parties took part in the elec-
tions. Some 21, mostly local and ethnic-based, political parties contested in
the SNNP. In Amhara and Oromia regions 13 and 16 political parties, respect-
ively, took part in in the election. The Gambella Peoples Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Movement (GPRDM) was the sole contestant in the Gambella region.
As can be seen from Table 2, EPRDF, through its constituent parties,
deployed 1350 candidates in the four highland regions that are considered
to be its strong support base, thereby, contesting for every seat in the councils
of these regions. The party did not, however, contest in the other five regions
leaving those for its affiliates except, for reasons that are explained below, the
OPDO, a member of EPRDF, fielded 20 candidates in some parts of Hareri and
Afar regions.
The opposition parties also put candidates to regional councils in selected
regions. For instance, Medrek had 639 candidates who ran for regional councils
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inOromia, Tigray andSNNP regions. Some regional oppositionparties also fielded
candidates in their respective regions. For instance, Western Somali Democratic
Party (WSDP) and Somali Democratic Alliance Forces (SDAF) contested in
Somali region while OFC, Oromo Liberation Unity Front (OLUF), Geda System
Advancement Party (GSAP), and All Oromo People Democratic Party (AOPDP)
contested in Oromia. Several small local parties also contested in the SNNP.
Table 2. Political parties and their candidates for regional elections.
Political parties Abbreviation No candidates
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRDF 1350
Ethiopia Federal Democratic Unity Forum Medrek 639
Blue Party BP 204
Ethiopian Democratic Party EDP 172
Somali people Democratic party SPDP 273
Coalition for Unity and Democratic Party CUDP 119
All Ethiopian Democratic Organization AEDO 109
Unity for Democracy and Justice Party UDJP 95
Gambella Peoples Unity Democratic Movement GPUDM 156
All Oromo People Democratic Party AOPDP 70
New Generation Party NGP 58
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party BGPDP 99
Ethiopian Raie Party ERP 62
Afar Nation Democratic Party ANDP 93
Gumz People’s Democratic Movement GPDM 85
Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement EDUM 38
Ethiopian Democratic U 43
Ethiopian Justice and Democratic Forces Front EJDFF 36
SidamaHadicho People Democratic Organization SHPDO 43
Oromo National Congress ONC 31
Geda System Advancement Party GSAP 33
All Ethiopian National Movement AENM 22
Agew Democratic Party ADP 28
Ethiopian Peace and Democratic Party EPDP 20
Gedeo People Democratic Organization GPDO 21
Harari National League HNL 18
Oromo Liberation Unity Front OLUF 9
Bench People Democratic Organization BPDO 9
Wolayta People Democratic Front WPDF 8
Independent Candidate IC 3
Welene People Democratic Party WPDP 3
Dilwabi Peoples’ Democratic Movement DPDM 7
Donga People Democratic Organization 6
DentaDubamoKichinchila People’s Democratic Organization DDKPDO 5
Kembata People’s Congress KPC 5
All Amhara People’s Organization 3
Ethiopian’s Unity Democratic Organisation EUDO 0
Somali Democratic Alliance Forces SDAF 5
Dube and Degeni Nationality Democratic Party 3
Argoba People Democratic Organization APDO 3
Argoba Nationality Democratic Movement ANDM 3
TigriWorgi Nationality Democratic Organization TWNDO
Western Somali Democratic Party WSDP 2
All EDP AEDP –
SodoGordona Peoples’ Democratic Organization SGPDO
Ethiopian National Unity Party ENUP –
3991
Source: NEBE, 2015.
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The 2015 regional election results
As was briefly mentioned above, EPRDF (its constituent parties) and affiliates
declared a total victory in the May 2015 regional elections. Every single can-
didate that these parties fielded for the election became a winner. Therefore,
now an EPRDF member party or an affiliate party controls every seat in every
regional council. As can be seen from Table 3, the TPLF controls all of the 152
seats in the Tigray state council and the ANDM occupies all of the 294 seats of
the Amhara state council. Likewise, the OPDO and SEPDM hold every seat in
the SNNP and Oromia regional councils.
Likewise, the affiliate parties have full control of their respective regional
councils. According to the official elections result, GPRDM received 100
percent of the votes cast in Gambella. The HNL (an EPRDF affiliate party) and
OPDO (members of EPRDF) equally share the 36 seats in the Hareri Regional
Council.12 The national election results also mirror the results of the regional
elections. EPRDF won 501 of the 547 seats in the HoPR which amounts to 91
percent of the seats in the HoPR. Its affiliate parties claimed the rest.
EPRDF’s dominance in national, regional, and local elections is neither
unprecedented nor unexpected even though the 2015 elections result was
unparalleled13 in that it brought about the complete exclusion of opposition
parties from all federal and regional councils. This begs the question; what
helps the EPRDF maintain its electoral dominance?
EPRDF’s ‘menu of institutional manipulation’
As was briefly stated in the introduction, the EPRDF has ‘menus of institutional
manipulations’ that it uses to retain its incumbency. These include a favour-
able electoral system, an organ of elections administration which is under
its control, local authorities. The semi-consociational arrangement that
guides the relationships of members and affiliates of the EPRDF, along with








Total no. seats in the state
council
Tigray 6 TPLF 2,374,574 99.39 152 152
Afar 9 ANDP 817,107 99 93 96
OPDO 8253 1 3
Amhara 13 ANDM 7,314,564 93 294 294
Oromia 16 OPDO 10,877,190 93 537 537
Somali 6 SPDP 2,621,088 99.97 273 273
BG 5 BGPDP 222,790 81 99 99
Gambella 1 GPRDM 195,335 100 155 155
SNNP 21 SEPDM 5,836,849 93.74 345 345
Hareri 5 HNL 19,791 19.1 18 36
OPDO 84,097 80.9 18
Total 30,371,638 1989
Source: NEBE, 2015.
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the ‘ineptitude’ of the opposition parties, also helps the former maintain its
dominance.
Electoral system
The first is in EPRDF’s menus of institutional manipulation is the electoral
system. As was stated above the plurality electoral system is the working
system for all elections in Ethiopia. This electoral system has been a conten-
tious matter among the country’s political parties since the 1990s. Opposition
parties allege that the plurality electoral system arose from the ruling party’s
‘constitutional engineering’ to ensure its continued dominance (Merera,
2002). Having blamed, among others, the current electoral system for their
poor electoral performances, the opposition parties had demanded the
implementation of the proportional representation (PR) system for all elec-
tions. The ruling party, on the other hand, was adamant on maintaining the
current electoral system claiming that the PR system would result in party
fragmentation rendering decision making prolonged and difficult.
There is a disagreement among scholars on the actual impacts of the elec-
toral system on the elections results in Ethiopia. For instance, John Ishiyama
(2009), based on the 2005 election, maintains that the past electoral results
would not have shown significant changes even if a PR system was in use.
Moreover, as Table 3 shows, each of EPRDF’s constituent units received a
minimum of 93 percent of the total votes validly counted in their respective
regions. The picture is the same in the lowland regions; the domains of the affili-
ate parties. If one accepts the official result as reflective of the true will of the
voters, it becomes clear that the electoral system had little or no impact on
the electoral outcome of the 2015 regional elections. In any case, following
the ten-month public protests that engulfed the country in 2016,14 the under-
lying cause of which was believed to be the complete exclusion of all dissenting
views from all regional and federal institutions, the ruling party has agreed to
introduce a reform on the country’s electoral system. Mulatu Teshome, the
FDRE President, in his annual state of the nation address thus stated:
In the last two elections, the ruling party, and its allies, won 99.9% and 100% of
the seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives. Although, all those seats
were won through free and fair, periodic elections, the result left the substantial
number of votes given to opposition parties unrepresented in the HoPR. The
electoral system in effect left out demands that might have been represented
by parties other than the ruling party. (Solomon, 2016)
The president further stated that the electoral system would be reviewed
and, to this effect, the Constitution might even be amended (Solomon,
2016). Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn also stated the reform was
necessary to ensure different political opinions are represented in the coun-
try’s representative councils (Adem, 2015). It is, however, unclear what
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electoral system would be adopted. Nor is it clear whether the electoral
system reform relates to only national elections or also to both national and
subnational elections. From his speech in Parliament, a mixture of the plurality
and PR systems seems to be what the prime minister has in mind. This is
however yet to be determined through negotiations between EPRDF, opposi-
tion political parties, and other stakeholders, which is already underway.
The NEBE: a non-neutral umpire
The other institution in EPRDF’s menu of institutional manipulations is the
NEBE. The Constitution allows the party controlling the federal government
to exclusively determine the composition of the NEBE. Under the Consti-
tution (art 102(2)) the Prime Minister is authorized to nominate nine
members the NEBE who would then be confirmed by the HoPR. The NEBE
has also deconcentrated regional and local structure which the Board itself
establishes. The political neutrality the head, and other members, of the
NEBE has therefore been suspect. The opposition have been demanding to
have a say in the selection of members of the NEBE, a demand that EPRDF
rebuffed.
Several reports show that the NEBE is far from independent or politically
neutral. Opposition parties allege that EPRDF makes sure that, the NEBE at
all level, is filled with its own members who obviously lack a modicum of inde-
pendence. For instance, Beyene Petros, the former chairperson of Mederk,
maintained: ‘[since the 2005 elections] the competence of the Board has
gone down… I don’t see people of integrity from top to bottom. It is not
serving the nation and the democratic transition in this country’.15 The Euro-
pean Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) (2010), in its report on the
2010 general elections, confirmed that the NEBE staff, at federal, state and
local level, were government employees and civil servant who were often
members of the ruling party. The EU Mission further observed that local
authorities, who were evidently members of the ruling party, served as elec-
toral authorities in certain areas (EUEOM, 2010). The fact, and indeed the
perception, that the NEBE is controlled by those who are members of
EPRDF are among the main causes for the lack of trust among the opposition
parties in the independence of the NEBE.
Furthermore, it is often alleged that members and employees of the NEBE
create all sorts of difficulties on the opposition parties. They come up with
various excuses to refuse registering the opposition parties’ candidates.
Beyene complained that officials of the NEBE refused to register some of
his party’s candidates for the 2015 elections.
We have a standard format where we introduce a candidate. I signed on the
paper and we photocopied that paper and put original seal on each and
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every page of the paper. I cannot sign on the form of every candidate. This is
how we operated all over the country. But now at the eleventh hour they
refused to register. They use such tactics and pretexts to frustrate our partici-
pation in the electoral process. The NEBE does not seem to be informed on
the basics of the election process.16
The opposition also allege that the NEBE readily takes the side of EPRDF
whenever there is an electoral dispute between the two sides. They even
accuse the NEBE of serving as EPRDF’s right hand in terms of causing division
within them. The claim in this respect is that EPRDF uses infiltrators to sow div-
ision within the leadership of the opposition parties. When such division
occurs and the dispute is brought to it, the NEBE allegedly chooses one
faction, often the one which is amenable to EPRDF, over another, and recog-
nizes the former as the legitimate leadership of the party. This was supposedly
what happened when internal disputes arose within the Unity for Democracy
and Justice (UDJ) and the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP). In both cases, the
NEBE recognized ‘minority splinter groups… at the expense of the majority
hence weakening the parties’ and putting its impartiality and independence
into question (Neamin, 2015).
Media and CSOs
The Ethiopian print media enjoyed a relative freedom in the early 1990s and
early 2000s. As a result, newspapers and magazines mushroomed in the first
ten or so years after EPRDF assumed power. The government however
retained exclusive control over radio and television stations. Moreover,
freedom of the press was slowly eroded in the successive years. The 2005 elec-
tions changed everything in this regard. The private media reported favour-
ably about opposition parties before and after the elections while being
critical of the ruling party. This did not settle well with the latter and, therefore,
it began taking various measures to restrict free press (Aalen and Tronvoll,
2009: 193).
The government thus passed several pieces of legislation that had the
impact of, if not intended to, restricting freedom of the press, the most impor-
tant ones being Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Pro-
clamation 590/2008 and Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009. The first
one contains several restrictions that eat into the freedom of the press includ-
ing a ‘defamation clause’ which imposes criminal liability for ‘accusations and
defamation against the constitutionally established legislative, executive or
judicial authorities’. One’s criminal liability in this respect does not depend
on whether or not an individual member of these institutions has sustained
material or psychological damage as a result of a certain media report. This
means ‘journalists and other members of the media can be criminally prose-
cuted, fined, or jailed for defamation when there is no victim’ (Ross, 2010:
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1060). The Anti-terrorism proclamation (art 6) renders a crime publishing or
causing the publication of
a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the
public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other
inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act
of terrorism.
The crime is punishable with 10–20 years of imprisonment.
The above laws resulted in the closure of several private newspapers. More-
over, until recently there was no a single private radio or television station.
Only government-owned TV and radio stations existed to which EPRDF had
unlimited access. This obviously helped the party maintain its incumbency.
The federal government also issued a proclamation (621/2009) that sought
to regulate the activities of CSOs. The government reportedly decided to
adopt this proclamation because some CSOs showed an interest to act as
independent observers in the 2005 election and they dared to take the
matter to court when the NEBE initially tried to curtail their involvement in
this regard (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009: 111). The CSO proclamation contains
several provisions that aim to restrict the operations of CSOs including strict
registration and licencing requirements and intrusive government inspection
regime.17 Moreover, the proclamation categorizes CSOs into Ethiopian, Ethio-
pian residents, and foreign CSOs depending on their membership and origin
of funds.18 It further provides that only Ethiopian CSOs could raise political
issues, engage in advocacy of human rights, democratic participation, and
promotion of efficiency in justice administration and law enforcement and
the like. Other CSOs, as per this law, are restricted to providing relief in case
of emergency, undertaking charity works, or engaging in activities that are
less politically sensitive, such as, sport and culture (art. 14(5)). So only Ethio-
pian CSOs can engage in acts of promoting democracy.
This has two inter-related problems. First, most of the Ethiopian CSOs,
including youth associations, women associations, teachers’ associations
and the like, are affiliates of the ruling party.19 Second, the few Ethiopian
CSOs that are indeed independent operate under severe financial constraints
(since they have to raise over 90 percent of their revenue from domestic
sources) and fear of being accused of having affiliation with opposition
parties and losing their licences. Even worse some of the leaders of such
CSOs are criminally charged and sent to jail (Awol and Beza, 2015: 290).
The CSO and anti-terrorism laws allowed the ruling party to decimate auton-
omous CSOs and private newspapers and prevent them from serving as ‘voices
of dissent and criticism’ (Awol and Beza, 2015). This, in turn, seems gave the
government a freehand to restrict ‘normal democratic initiatives’ and to label
‘unlawful’ and crackdown on ‘peaceful opposition political activit[ies]’(Awol
and Beza, 2015). In the absence of strong CSOs in the country, the government
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refused to invite, even rejected the offer from, the EU and American election
observers under the pretext of ‘relying on domestic resources than foreign
judgment on the credibility of the [electoral] processes’.20 The 2015 regional
election was hence held in the absence of international elections observers;
the first election since 1991 to be conducted without international observers.
Local authorities
As stated at the beginning, local authorities are indispensable for authoritarian
regimes for maintaining their incumbency. The same seems to be the case in
Ethiopia. Since it assumed power in 1991, EPRDF has been careful not to lose
control of local government.21 And it has effectively used local authorities to
control electoral outcomes. Even more, the party had introduced several
measures that aimed at ensuring that local government is within its exclusive
domain. Themost notablemeasure in this respectwas increasing local councils’
seats (from 600,000 to 3.6 million) under the pretext of creating ‘an expanded
forum for public participations’ (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 116). The ulterior
motive for the expansion of local councils, however, was preventing ‘any oppo-
sition party from gaining influence in the local government elections’ since
none of the parties, other than EPRDF, could put such number of candidates
in the local election (Bertelsmann Transformation, 2009). Local government
and local authorities, in turn, worked towards maintaining EPRDF’s dominance.
[Local authorities] control the local police forces and other security apparatuses
which they often use to the detriment of opposition parties. For instance, a
woreda administrator is in charge of a woreda police force. In order to hold
public rallies, demonstrations, or public meetings, local authorities need to be
‘informed’ of the arrangements so that they can provide security. If local officials
‘cannot’ provide security – and often they ‘could not’ – such rallies, meetings and
demonstrations cannot take place. (Zemelak 2011, 149)
As it is often alleged, local authorities harass and intimidate members and
candidates of the opposition often forcing the latter to withdraw from the
electoral process. In the 2010 general elections, for instance, 72 opposition
candidates withdrew from the elections due to alleged intimidation and har-
assment from local authorities (Tronvoll, 2010: 8).
The semi-consociational arrangement within EPRDF
The other institutional mechanism that allows EPRDF to maintain its electoral
dominance is the semi-consociational principle based on which the party is
established and that requires cooperation among the constituent units of the
party.22 As was stated elsewhere, the Ethiopian federal system provides territor-
ial autonomy to the major ethnic groups by establishing nine states and several
more sub-state territorial units that are organized along ethnic lines. The four
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ethnic-based regional parties that form the EPRDF each governs one of the four
largest regions (Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, and Tigray). Those regional parties that
are affiliates of EPRDF control the remainders of the states. The EPRDF and its
members operate in a semi-consociational arrangement that allows them to
control the states and the federal government. Each member of the EPRDF
enjoys some degree of autonomy in the manner it runs the state under its
control; notwithstanding the principle of democratic centralism based on
which the EPRDF operates (EPRDF Statute, art 7). The regional parties are also
represented in the different structures of the EPRDF on an equal basis
(EPRDF Statute, Chapter 3). Hence TPLF which claims to be a representative
of 6 million Tigrayans has equal representation in EPRDF’s various structures
with OPDO, a party that claims to represent about 35 million Oromos. Decisions
in EPRDF are principally made based on consensus.
These regional parties, which are members or affiliates of the EPRDF,
cooperate with each other for the purpose of controlling their respective
regions and the federal government. They coordinate their campaign against
the opposition parties during election periods and avoid competing against
each other. An EPRDF member or affiliate party seldom deploys a candidate
into a region that is considered to be the political domain of one of the
other sister parties even if members of the ethnic community that the former
claims to represent are found in the region. This seems why that OPDO did
not deploy candidates in the Amhara region in the 2015 national and regional
elections even though there are about half a million Oromos in Amhara region
having their own ethnic local government in Kemisse area. Nor did TPLF had its
candidates run for election in the Metema area of the Amhara region where
there are a substantial number of Tigrayans. Indeed, as stated earlier, OPDO
had candidates who ran for elections in the Hareri region. This is also under-
taken based on the semi-consociational system under consideration.
In addition, EPRDF deploys candidates that are drawn from its member
parties for elections in the two federal cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)
since these are multi-ethnic cities that no specific ethnic community can
claim as its exclusive domain. The candidates so drawn run for elections in
the two cities representing EPRDF, as opposed to OPDO, ANDM, or TPLF
(EPRDF Statute, Art 25).23 Member parties of the EPRDF run the governments
of the two federal cities on cosociational basis. For instance, the previous
and current mayors of Addis Ababa were from the Oromo community
(from OPDO) while the deputy mayors were from the Amhara community
(from ANDM).
‘Ineptitude’ opposition
Schedler (2002a: 42) maintains that the electoral victory of authoritarian
regimes is not solely due to the strength of the regimes. It is also because
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of the ‘ineptitude of’ the opposition. This is also true in Ethiopia where EPRDF’s
electoral dominance is in part due to the weaknesses of the opposition
parties. The Ethiopian opposition parties are extremely fragmented. Indeed,
as stated above, many of them have similar ideological orientation and politi-
cal programme. For instance, the BP and the EDP both claim to be ‘liberal’ in
their ideological orientation and often declare their disapproval of the ethnic
federal system.24 The majority of the opposition parties are ethnic-based
which agree with EPRDF on almost on everything. Their main reservation is
that EPRDF has not sufficiently implemented the ethnic federal system. Yet
those opposition parties that have similar ideological outlook are seldom
seen bringing their members and resources together to create a formidable
opposition against the ruling party (Arriola and Lyons, 2016: 78). Indeed,
around election time various coalitions are created which however barely
last a single electoral cycle before crumbling. The disintegration of the CUD
into its constituent units following the 2005 election is just a case in point.
Furthermore, as was shown above, members and affiliates of EPRDF
cooperate with each other and avoid competitions among themselves. On
the other hand, opposition parties contest against each other in every elec-
toral district, enabling EPRDF to easily defeat them. They eliminate each
other before even voting begins. For instance, an NEBE directive on the regis-
tration of candidates (1/2009) provides that no more than 12 candidates
(parties) could contest in a single electoral district. When there are more
than 12 candidates in a single electoral district, first those who run as ICs
would be eliminated. If the number of candidates still exceeds 12, then six
parties which participated in previous elections and received the highest
votes would be retained while the fate of the rest of the parties (candidates)
would be determined by lots drawn by the NEBE. Three candidates of the BP,
including Yilikal Getnet, the then chairman of the party, were eliminated from
the 2015 national elections due to this rule (Neamin, 2015).25
The opposition parties also suffer from acute financial constraints. They
raise little revenue from member contributions and other internal sources.
They are by law prohibited from engaging in businesses and receiving
donation from foreign sources (Proclamation 573(2008), art 52(1)). Members
of the Ethiopian diaspora, especially those in Western countries, are the oppo-
sitions’ main source of revenue. And these often attach different conditions
for their grants including requiring the opposition parties to focus on national
election, as opposed to regional or local elections (Wondwosen, 2009). EPRDF,
on the other hand, has an immense financial capacity. Moreover, government
properties such as kebele halls, government vehicles, state radio, and televi-
sion are at its disposal.
Various donors provide the NEBE with considerable revenue with a view to
encouraging electoral democracy in the country which the latter disburses for
the political parties. Firstly, the fund is simply a grant, not an entitlement that a
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party can rightfully demand. Hence the revenue may be available in one elec-
toral period and absent in the next. Second, the criteria for the division of the
revenue are skewed in favour of EPRDF. The most important criterion in divid-
ing the money among political parties is the number of seats that each party
occupies in parliament and state councils (Proclamation 573(2008), 45(1)). This
clearly allows EPRDF to take almost the entire portion of the grant that is dis-
persed based on the seats each party has in parliament. For instance, as was
indicated earlier, the 2010–2015 parliament was almost fully controlled by
EPRDF with the exception a single seat that was occupied by an opposition
party member. The NEBE made available 29,793,102.41 Ethiopian Birr
($1,316,907) as a grant to be divided among all political parties and to be
used for the 2015 elections. Half of this money (ETB 14,879,734.62 or
$657,710) went to EPRDF. EPRDF received approximately ETB 8 million
($353,614) simply for controlling all the seats in parliament.26
Vanguardism: the driver of EPRDF’s ‘electoral authoritarianism’
As was stated at the beginning, EPRDF’s electoral authoritarianism is under-
pinned by its vanguardist self-view. Vangardism is a Marxisit Leninist notion
which is often linked to the establishment of a party or a similar organization
by the most ‘class conscious’ members of the working class to lead the latter
in its ‘revolutionary struggle’. Vangardism, as initially conceptualized by Marx,
seems to envisage a democratic organization of the working class (Jones,
1990). However, Lenin and, later on, Mao reconceptualized vanguardism as
a process of creating a party ‘which is sovereign above all other workers’
organizations’ (Socialist Labor Party of America, 2007).
Vangaurdism is elitist in a sense that it envisages a centralized party with a
hierarchical structure. This is based on the premise that the consciousness of
the majority of the working class is at ‘trade union consciousness’ level and,
therefore, ordinary members of this class are incapable of ‘emancipating’
themselves (Topper, 1982). Workers thus need to be directed by a party
that is under the leadership of ‘professional revolutionaries [and] the unques-
tioned discipline of a central committee’ (Topper, 1982). Hence those in the
leadership positions of the vanguard party – in particular members of the
central committee – are expected to control everything and they are con-
trolled by no one. Other organizations of the working class, or any organiz-
ation for that matter, are not allowed to exist. If they ever exist, they are
expected to play a subordinate role to the vanguard party (Topper, 1982).
EPRDF has espoused the Marxisit Leninist notion of vanguardism to fit its
own purpose.
Political contestations based on the notion of vanguardism is not a new
phenomenon in the Ethiopian political history. It can be traced back to the
1960s when Marxims Leninsm was the most dominant ideology of the
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Ethiopian Student Movement (Bahru, 2014). Some of the multi-ethnic parties
that sprang from this movement, including Ethiopian People Revolutionary
Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Workers Movement (also known in its
Amharic acronym as Meison), saw the social problems in the country as pri-
marily emanating from ‘class contradictions’ (Asnake, 2012). The ethnic
ones, such as TPLF and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), on the other hand,
saw the problems in the country as principally originating from a century of
ethnic-based marginalization. In any case, the parties in both camps, by
espousing Marxist Leninists political theories to fit their own purpose,
declared themselves vanguard parties of the groups they supposed to rep-
resent. Hence EPRP and Meison each saw itself as a national vanguard party
and was determined to eliminate (often through violence) any possible con-
tender. This conviction of the two parties led to the Red Terror in which
members of these parties massacred each other (Bahru, 2008).
The ethnic-based parties took as a strategy to conduct guerrilla warfare
against the Derg in the areas where the ethnic community that they claim
to represent is situated (Vaughan, 2011; Asnake, 2012: 63). Hence TPLF
began military operation in Tigray area while OLF began operating in differ-
ent parts of what is now known as the Oromia region. Having the view that
they were vanguards of the ethnic communities in which they were
imbedded, the ethnic parties were unwilling to allow any other party,
ethnic or multi-ethnic, to operate in the areas they considered as belonging
to the relevant ethnic communities. Hence in the 1970s, TPLF demanded
EPRP to leave Assimba, a mountainous area in Tigray, wherefrom the
latter was conducing military operation against the Derg. TPLF asserted
that only it could operate in Tigray as the vanguard of the Tigray people
(Gebru, 2008, Ethiopian Calendar). The refusal of the EPRP to accede to
the demands of the TPLF, among others, led to a war between the two
groups and TPLF drove EPRP out of the region (Gebru, 2008). Likewise, in
the early 1990s OPDO emerged (allegedly created by TPLF) claiming to be
the vanguard party of the Oromo (International Crisis Group, 2009). Yet,
OLF, which also saw itself as the vanguard party of the Oromo, opposed
OPDO’s operating in the Oromia region. This, among others, led to some
military skirmishes between EPRDF’s fighters and OLF’s fighters in 1992
and the latter were defeated and driven out of Oromia.
EPRDF’s notion of vanguardism is thus simply an extension of TPLF’s van-
guardist style that found continuity in the current dispensation. It is also an
offshoot of EPRDF’s ‘revolutionary democracy’ ideology, an ideology that is
underpinned by the theory of Marxism Leninism. Revolutionary democracy,
as Gebru (2008), a veteran of TPLF, argues, categorizes the political groups
in the country into those that are committed to promoting the peoples’ inter-
est and those that are enemies of the people. The ideology sanctions the
exclusion from the country’s political life of those that are considered to be
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in the latter category. Gebru further states that revolutionary democracy is
based on the view that there must be a vanguard party that exercises exclu-
sive control over the country’s political, economic, and social movements.
Revolutionary democracy… teaches the preeminence of the party [EPRDF] and
its vanguard status. It links democracy with class division and teaches that
democracy is for the oppressed and not for those who are considered to be
oppressors. Moreover, [it requires] that the ruling party to be in control of all
government institutions including parliament, state councils, executive organs,
security apparatuses and judicial bodies. It also requires civil associations and,
indeed, the society at large, to be under the control and influence of the
ruling party. The existence of a free press and media is thus viewed as contrary
to this objective. In general, [revolutionary democracy is based on the belief
that] activities that are outside the control of the party had to be limited.
(Gebru 2016: 181)
The Statute of the party also shows that EPRDF views itself as a vanguard
party of the country and its role at the national level as the role of a vanguard
party.
For the realization of the programmes of EPRDF, the people should internalize
and struggle for their achievement. In order to enable people to rally behind
the objectives of revolutionary democracy and to struggle for their accomplish-
ment, EPRDF is expected to play the role of a vanguard by bracing up its organiz-
ational capacity to lead the people in their efforts to raise their consciousness and
organize themselves. (EPRDF program, 2006)27
As a vanguard party, EPRDF asserts to itself the role of providing ‘political
leadership to all of the ethnic regions either through its member organizations
or affiliates’ (Asnake, 2012). Within the context of the country’s ethnic federal
system, EPRDF’s vanguardist view is that every ethnic community should have
one vanguard party and that the ethnic community needs no other party to
champion its cause. At the regional level, therefore, each of EPRDF’s constitu-
ent parties is expected to play the role of a vanguard party with respect to the
relevant ethnic community and region. Hence TPLF deems itself (and is
viewed by the sister parties) as the vanguard party of the Tigray ethnic
community and region (ICG, 2009). Likewise, OPDO, ANDM, SPDM deem
themselves as vanguard parties of the Oromia, Amhara, and SNNP, respect-
ively. Each of the affiliate parties which governs each of the remaining five
regions is created, allegedly by the EPRDF, to play a similar role (Vaughan,
2006: 186). Any party that seeks to champion the causes of any of the
ethnic communities of which a member or an affiliate of the EPRDF views
itself as vanguard party can thus be prevented from gaining any foothold.
This vanguardist view of EPRDF, its constituent units and affiliates and the
tendency to exclude, it is maintained, underpins the electoral outcome of
the 2015 regional elections.
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The 1995 Constitution indeed entrenches multiparty democracy in which
parties that are organized regionally or nationally, along ethnic lines or other-
wise, can participate in democratic elections, at all levels of government.
Hence EPRDF, its constituent parties or affiliates have no choice but to
allow opposition parties to exist. Yet, the notion of vanguardism that
shapes EPRDF’s outlook makes it view with disdain the very existence of
other parties, in particular those that seek to champion the causes of the
ethnic communities whose interest the vanguard parties claim to promote.
Hence the vanguard parties take all sorts of measures to hinder the operation
of opposition parties. Moreover, opposition parties, to the extent they are
allowed to exist, as EPRDF’s officials are often heard saying, are expected to
merely serve as a mirror through which EPRDF could see its own weaknesses
and defects so that it can self-correct.28 They are not supposed to be serious
political opponents which possibly can unseat the vanguard parties through
competitive elections.
EPRDF’s self-view as national vanguard party is therefore what drives it to
maintain electoral dominance. The drive to maintain its dominance, in turn,
leads it to employ ‘menus of institutional manipulations’ including the elec-
toral board, courts, the police, and CSOS and the like (Bassi, 2014).
Conclusion
The May 2015 regional elections brought about an unprecedented outcome
in the post-1991 political history of Ethiopia in the sense that it led to 100
percent control of every seat in every regional council by EPRDF’s constitu-
ent parties and the affiliates. ICs and opposition parties were completely
excluded from all regional councils. The electoral results of the 2015 regional
elections were so because, as in the elections previously held, EPRDF made
use of a ‘menu of institutional manipulations’ that was at its disposal to
retain its incumbency. In the menu were favourable electoral systems, an
election administrating organ which is under EPRDF’s control, several
pieces of legislation that are designed to stifle free press and restrict auton-
omous CSOs.
EPRDF is driven to use the aforementioned institutional manipulations by
its vanguardist self-view. The semi-consociational system that guides the
relationship of the constituent parties of EPRDF, over and above the fragmen-
tation of the opposition parties, came in handy for EPRDF’s vanguardist aspira-
tion of controlling all political institutions of the country.
So, what is the significance of the 2015 regional elections for democracy/
democratization in Ethiopia? Should regional elections under EPRDF, all elec-
tions for that matter, be dismissed as meaningless periodical exercise without
any consequence for democratization in the country? This author maintains
otherwise. Elections under authoritarian regimes, by definition, have no
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certain outcome even though, given all sorts of institutional advantages they
have, authoritarian regimes are likely to retain their incumbency. This is
because electoral authoritarians only ‘reduce’, not completely remove, the
risk of losing power through elections, lest they should lose their democratic
facade (Schedler, 2010). There is, therefore, always a chance that even an
authoritarian regime may be unseated through elections. It is important to
recall that EPRDF itself came very close to losing power in the 2005 national
and regional elections. What is crucial is that the 1995 Constitution establishes
multiple representative councils at multiple levels of government, entrenches
multiparty elections, and that elections are indeed organized without inter-
ruptions. Elections will not be entirely pointless in Ethiopia so long this
remains to be the case.
Constitutions and laws
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution 1995.
Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009.
Charities and Societies Proclamation 621/2009.
The Revised Political Parties Registration Proclamation 573/2008.
The Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation 532/2007.
The Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation 532/2007.
Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation 590/
2008.
Notes
1. The nine subnational units of the Ethiopian federation are Afar, Amhara, Oromia,
Tigray, Somali, Hareri, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and the SNNP. Each of the
first five regions has a dominant ethnic community and bears the name of the
ethnic community. Hareri, a small city-state, has also taken the name of the
ethnic community to which it is established, despite the community being
numerically in the minority in the region. The rest of the regions, in particular
the SNNP, are multi-ethnic with no ethnic community in the majority.
2. These are also referred to as ‘“semi-democracy,” “virtual democracy,” “electoral
democracy,” “pseudo-democracy,” “illiberal democracy “semi-authoritarianism,”
“soft authoritarianism”’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002).
3. The lower house is the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR) while the upper
house if the House of Federation (HoF). The HoF does not, however, play any leg-
islative role. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution 1995,
Arts 53–63.
4. A national party is a party over 60 percent of whose founders are from at least
four regions while regional party is a party about 60 percent of whose founding
members are from a single region. The Revised Political Parties Registration Pro-
clamation 573(2008) Arts 5 & 6.
5. After the fall of the Derg and during the transitional period EPRDF fighters
‘marched’ to the present-day SNNP. In the area, they mobilized the various
ethnic groups into small ethnic-based political parties. The teachers in the
area were particular targets of recruitment. Each of these parties now bears
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the name of the ethnic group they claim to represent followed by ‘people demo-
cratic organization’ (PDO). Hence these parties are commonly called as PDOs
(Vaughan, 2006).
6. Members of this coalition are Ethiopian Social Democracy-Southern Coalition
Unity Party (ESD-SCUP), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), Union of Tigrayans
for Democracy & Sovereignty (UTDS), and Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM).
The EJDFF is composed of Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), Unity of Southern
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (USEDF) and Oromia Liberation National Party
(OLNP). The USEDF, in turn, is a regional coalition made up Wolayta People’s
Democratic Front, Gamo Democratic Union, and Gomogofa Peoples Democratic
Union, which are local ethnic-based political parties operating in the SNNP.
7. Almost every ethnic-based party, which is a member of, or an affiliate to, EPRDF,
seems to have a corresponding party in the opposition camp. For example,
Medrek is composed of four ethnic political parties claiming to be the voices
of the Oromo, Tigray, and several ethnic communities of the SNNP, more or
less mirroring EPRDF. The Ethiopian Social Democracy-Southern Coalition
Unity Party (ESD-SCUP), which is one of the members of the Medrek, is a
coalition of a number of ethnic-based parties, which claim to represent
certain ethnic communities in SNNP. The ESD-SCUP can thus be considered as
the counterpart of the SEPDM in the opposition camp Wondwosen, 2009)
8. The election to the Addis Ababa City Council was previously held with the
general elections. This has changed since the 2005 general election and now
the elections to the two federal cities are held as a part of local elections. The
last elections for the city councils of the two cities were held as part of the
2013 local election. Ashenafi Endale ‘Local elections get underway’ (Addis
Fortune, 14 April 2013).
9. The Electoral Proclamation authorises the NEBE, with the approval of the HoPR,
to conduct national and regional elections at different times, if the former deems
necessary. This has not happened thus far. Art 28(2)
10. For instance, in 2005, the general election in the Somali region was held on 21
August 2015, three months after it was held in the rest of the country.
11. ኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ምርጫ ቦርድ 2007 ዓ/ም ጠቅላላ ምርጫ አጠቃላይ ውጤት (National Electoral
Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) Official Results of the 2015 general elections).
12. Hareri is viewed and established as the regional homeland of the Hareri ethnic
community. Yet the community constitutes only 13 percent of the total popu-
lation in the region. The regional constitution provides for the establishment
of two regional houses; the People’s Representative Assembly (PRA) which has
22 seats and the Harari National Assembly (HNA) which has 14 seats. The two
together form the 36 seats of the Hareri state council. The PRA is composed
based on a consociational arrangement in which party/parties representing
the Hareri community control a portion of the seats in the council while
another representing the Oromo community controls the rest. The HNA is
entirely controlled by a party representing the Hareri community. This arrange-
ment excludes members of ethnic communities residing in the region other
than the Oromo and Hareri from any representation (Van der Baken, 2014).
13. Opposition parties and/or independent candidates had some, in fact growing,
representation, in the state councils. EPRDF and its affiliates were in control of
96 percent of the regional councils of the transitional period after the June
1992 local and regional elections (Keller, 1995). Many of the opposition parties
boycotted the 1995 general election including, therefore, the regional election.
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Yet some individual who runs as independent candidates won a number of seats
in some of the state councils. In the 2000 general election opposition parties,
such as All Amhara People Organization (AAPO) and EDP, managed to win 53
seats in the Addis Ababa city the Amhara, Somali, and Benishangul-Gumuz
state councils. In the 2005 general election, the opposition parties had an
unparalleled success. CUD and UEDF in particular performed rather well in all
the regions except in Tigray where TPLF (supposedly the core of EPRDF) is
assumed to have unwavering support. CUD won 137 of the 138 seats of the
Addis Ababa City Council along with 196 seats in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, and
Benishangul-Gumuz regions. UEDF in turn, won 143 seats in Oromia, Hareri,
and SNNP regions. African Elections Database 14 May & 31 August 2000 regional
state council elections in Ethiopia http://africanelections.tripod.com/et_
2000state.html (Last accessed on 25 January 2017); African Elections Database
15 May & 21 August 2005 regional state council elections in Ethiopia http://
africanelections.tripod.com/et_2005state.html (Last accessed on 25 January
2017).
14. The public protests began in Oromia as demonstrations against the master plan
of the Addis Ababa city which sought to integrate the city with neighbouring
towns that are found in Oromia. These were followed by other protests in
Amhara region where protesters demanded that Wolqait, a district in Tigray,
should be part of the Amhara region. The protest grew in size and increasingly
became violent culminating in the death of dozens of people in the town of
Bishoftu, at the Irecca festival, an Oromo traditional thanks giving day festival.
15. The Reporter ‘A veteran politician speaks out’ (February 2015) http://
archiveenglish.thereporterethiopia.com/content/veteran-politician-speaks-out
(Last accessed on 1 February 2017).
16. The Reporter ‘A veteran politician’.
17. The Proclamation creates a government agency called ‘Charities and Societies
Agency’ which under the proclamation has the power to or not give licence
to a CSO and a wide supervisory power over CSOs which allow it to interfere
in the internal affairs CSOs.
18. A CSO is deemed Ethiopian if it is established by Ethiopian nationals, under
Ethiopian law. A CSO that raises over 90 percent of its funds from within the
country is also considered as Ethiopian CSO. A CSO formed by residents of Ethio-
pia and that receives over 10 percent of its revenue from foreign sources are
considered ‘Ethiopian residents’ CSO. A foreign CSO is one established by
foreigners, under a foreign law. Societies proclamation, art 2(2–4).
19. Strategic Thinking on East Africa ‘The Role of Civil Society in Ethiopia’s Current
Crisis: Who will make the first move?’ <http://www.strathink.net/ethiopia/the-
role-of-civil-society-in-ethiopias-current-crisis-who-will-make-the-first-move/>
accessed on 26 May 2017.
20. The Reporter ‘A veteran politician speaks outs’.
21. For more on how critical local authoriteries are for EPRDF’s incumbency see
Zemelak, 2011.
22. Consociationalism is an institutional arrangement that aims at ensuring that pol-
itical powers are shared among major ethnic, religious, racial, or other social
groups of a country, depending on the social divide in it, with a view to prevent-
ing conflicts. A consociational political system works on the basis of negotiation
and compromise among the elites of the relevant identity groups. A govern-
ment that comes about as a result of a consociational arrangement is thus
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often referred to as ‘government by elite cartel’. Consociationalsim has three
institutional features ‘segmented’ or ‘group’ autonomy, PR and ‘mutual veto’.
Consociational arrangement may work at a party level in a sense a party may
be formed based on consocational principles (Bogaards, 2006; Andeweg,
2000; Lijphart, 2006).
23. See National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) Official Results of the 2015 general
elections.
24. Yilikal Getinet (the former chairperson of Blue Party) and Lidetu Ayalew (the
former chairman of EDP) have made this clear in various interviews. Recently
EDP seems to have adopted a moderate view on the country’s ethnic federalism.
For an Amahric interview Yilikal gave to an Amharic magazine called Life visit
http://hornaffairs.com/am/2013/05/22/ethiopia-semayawi-party-amhara-
oromo/ (Last accessed 1 February 2017).
25. Neamin (2017).
26. National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (2017).
27. EPRDF Program: Introduction available at <https://www.slideshare.net/Bereh11/
eprdf-program> (accessed on 18 April 2017). Emphasis added.
28. At a conference titled ‘የኢትዮጵያ የዴሞክራሲና የፌዴራል ስርዓት ግንባታ ከየት ወደ የት?’ (Ethio-
pia’s democracy and federal system: Where are they and where are they
heading?’) that Fana Broadcasting Corporate (FBC) hosted in October 2016,
Lidetu Ayalew, a prominent opposition party leader, reacting to Bereket
Simon’s reference to the role of the opposition parties as EPRDF’s ‘mirror’,
stated that such references show that EPRDF does not take opposition parties
seriously. The full video of the conference is available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pkHjaWImbpc&t=47s.
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